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1 Introduction
Although GDP has long been the main indicator of national progress, there is a growing
interest among researchers and policymakers in finding measures that better reflect a
population’s well-being (Fleurbaey, 2009). One option is to ask people directly how
happy or satisfied they are with their lives (Krueger and Stone, 2014). Following the
recommendations of the Stiglitz Commission on the Measurement of Social and Economic
Progress (2010) as well as reports by the EU (2009), OECD (2013) and US National
Research Council (2014), many countries and international organisations are beginning
to collect self-reported well-being—or “happiness”—data in order to measure societal
progress and guide policymaking (O’Donnell et al., 2014).1 However, it is not yet clear
whether citizens themselves evaluate progress and performance in these same terms, or
whether it is in politicians’ electoral interest to focus policy on subjective well-being
(SWB).
This paper employs SWB data together with general election results from a long-
run panel of European countries, and finds that voters hold incumbent governments to
account for the happiness of society. This has implications for the electoral incentives
faced by politicians to enact policy focused on improving the quality of people’s lives.
A growing literature on political economy shows that voters look to past government
performance in order to update their beliefs about incumbents and make forward-looking
vote choices (Besley, 2006).2 By holding governments accountable at the ballot box, this
“retrospective voting” behaviour enables voters to constrain the opportunistic behaviour
of politicians (Barro, 1973; Ferejohn, 1986) and selectively retain high quality incumbents
(Fearon, 1999). Electoral accountability means that, provided the benefits of re-election
are sufficiently large, the threat of being voted out of office induces politicians to formulate
policy in the interests of voters.
In line with the general focus on GDP as the principal measure of government per-
formance, the vast majority of empirical work on political accountability has examined
links between the state of the economy and the electoral fate of governing parties. A
voluminous research literature has established that the electorate holds incumbent gov-
ernments accountable for macroeconomic outcomes.3 One of the most-replicated and
1For example, the UK Office for National Statistics has added subjective well-being questions to a
number of its labour force and household surveys, and has committed to developing broad measures of
national well-being to supplement its existing indicators of national success like GDP (ONS, 2011). In
the USA, the Bureau of Labor Statistics has also recently begun to include questions on respondents’
emotional state to its American Time Use Survey (ATUS).
2This retrospective voting behaviour is central to a number of models that seek to illustrate, inter alia,
the source of political business cycles (Rogoff, 1990; Rogoff and Sibert, 1988), the welfare implications of
political competition (Besley, Persson and Sturm, 2010) and the separation of powers (Persson, Roland
and Tabellini, 1997), the way in which politicians set tax levels (Besley and Case, 1995a,b) and engage
in inefficient redistributive transfers (Coate and Morris, 1995), and the influence of political institutions
on levels of corruption (Ferraz and Finan, 2008, 2011).
3For reviews of the ‘economic voting’ literature, see, e.g., Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier (2000) and
2
well-known (particularly by politicians themselves) findings in economics is that voters
reward officeholders at the ballot box during periods of economic prosperity and punish
them during downturns (e.g. Duch and Stevenson, 2008; Fair, 1978; Fiorina, 1981; Key,
1966; Kramer, 1971; Lewis-Beck, 1988; Pissarides, 1980). Evidence of ‘economic voting’
suggests it is in the interests of politicians to ensure a buoyant economy; however, the
focus on macroeconomic outcomes leaves open the possibility that lawmakers may be left
unrestrained in a wide range of other policymaking areas that matter to the quality of
people’s lives.
Since the early 1970s, the European Commission has been surveying the citizens of
each of its member states twice a year on a number of issues including their well-being.
Since the question’s first inclusion in the Eurobarometer in 1973, a random sample of well
over one million respondents has now been asked the following: “On the whole, are you i)
very satisfied, ii) fairly satisfied, iii) not very satisfied, or iv) not at all satisfied with the
life you lead?” The responses to this type of self-reported well-being question have become
the focus of a burgeoning economic literature. Oswald and Wu (2010) demonstrate a
strong correlation between subjective measures of the well-being of different places and
objective measures of the quality of life derived using compensating differentials. SWB
is also sensitive to the main macroeconomic indicators over the business cycle (Di Tella,
MacCulloch and Oswald, 2003; Stevenson and Wolfers, 2008) as well to a number of non-
material but nevertheless policy-relevant factors such as noise and air pollution, health,
education, community cohesion, corruption, the effectiveness of government services, and
crime rates (Clark, Layard and Senik, 2012; Dolan, Peasgood and White, 2008; Helliwell
et al., 2014).
By replacing macroeconomic measures of national progress with a broader measure
of SWB in an otherwise standard cross-national economic voting analysis, this paper
shows that a country’s level of life satisfaction is a robust predictor of election results.
The magnitude of the relationship, which is robust to controlling for the state of the
macroeconomy, is substantively important: a one standard deviation change in a coun-
try’s self-reported well-being over time is associated with a swing in incumbent vote share
of around 8.5 percentage points. As well as using falsification or “placebo” tests that em-
ploy well-being reports taken from surveys in post-election years, the analysis shows the
findings are robust to adjusting life satisfaction responses for a number of individual de-
mographic and party-political determinants of well-being as well as to various alternative
specifications.
The results are interpreted within the context of a simple political agency model,
in which an incumbent politician is an agent of the voters.4 Electors decide whether
Nannestad and Paldam (1994).
4For excellent reviews of the literature on political agency—which began with the seminal work of
Barro (1973)—see Besley (2006) and Persson and Tabellini (2002).
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or not to retain officeholders, but are unable to directly observe either their actions or
type. Instead, in the spirit of Ferejohn’s seminal model of electoral accountability, they
are ‘only able to assess the effects of governmental performance on their own well-being’
(Ferejohn, 1986, p.11). Within this framework, an implication of retrospective voting is
that it incentivises politicians. The data suggest that incumbents enjoy an electoral payoff
not only for making voters materially better off—as the existing evidence of economic
voting suggests—but also for ensuring the electorate’s wider level of subjective well-being.
The findings augment the literature on economic voting and contribute to a small
body of work that links non-economic outcomes with electoral behaviour (Bechtel and
Hainmueller, 2011; Berry and Howell, 2007; Healy and Malhotra, 2009; Karol and Miguel,
2007). Finally, the analysis relates to a growing literature that links subjective well-
being with political behaviour (e.g. Dolan, Metcalfe and Powdthavee, 2008; Flavin and
Keane, 2012; Stutzer and Frey, 2006) as well as partisanship and ideology (Di Tella and
MacCulloch, 2005). In the paper closest in spirit to the analysis presented here, Liberini,
Redoano and Proto (2013) use British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) data to find an
association between individual well-being and self-reported voting intentions over time in
the UK.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the theoretical framework in
which the results are interpreted. Sections 3 and 4 summarise the data and empirical
strategy. Results are presented in section 5. Section 6 discusses academic and policy
implications as well as possible limitations and avenues for further research. Section 7
concludes.
2 Conceptual Framework
The political agency approach of Besley (2006) provides an ideal framework in which
to consider how a voter’s well-being informs her decision whether or not to reelect an
incumbent. This framework has been applied among others by Besley and Smart (2007)
and Ferraz and Finan (2011), and is a simple formulation of a principal-agent problem
with both adverse selection and moral hazard in which an incumbent politician is an agent
of the voters. Within this standard two-period model, elections play a role in selecting
good incumbents for a second period, whilst also providing incentives for bad politicians
to set well-being maximising policy in order to “pool” with good types in the hope of
being re-elected.5
5The simple model presented in this section is intended to establish the basic prediction of a positive
relationship between voter well-being and incumbent re-election. For a number of extensions to this
‘canonical’ model, such as the introduction of additional time-periods and term limits, see Besley (2006).
For examples of alternative models that also combine moral hazard with adverse selection, see Alt,
Bueno de Mesquita and Rose (2011); Ashworth (2005); Banks and Sundaram (1998). These alternative
models as well as the extended models of Besley (2006) lead to the similar basic prediction to be tested
4
Voters decide whether to re-elect politicians, but are unable to directly observe either
their actions or type. This informational asymmetry is central to the notion of rational
ignorance (Downs, 1957), which highlights the high cost of acquiring and filtering rele-
vant information relative to the low probability of a vote being decisive to an electoral
outcome. Even though people often lack knowledge about political and economic issues,6
Fiorina (1981, p. 6) nevertheless notes that voters ‘typically have one comparatively hard
bit of data: they know what life has been like during the incumbent’s administration’.
Observing one’s own satisfaction with life is essentially costless and requires no complex
knowledge of public policy issues.
A basic agency model
Consider a simple model with two time periods t ∈ {1, 2} and two types—good and bad—
of politician i ∈ {g, b}. In each period, the politician makes a policy decision xt ∈ {0, 1}.
The payoffs are dependent upon the state of nature st ∈ {0, 1}, each of which occurs with
equal probability. Given the action xt(sti) of the incumbent, voters receive a payoff of
H—which is interpreted as a high level of SWB—if xt = st and zero otherwise.
Good politicians formulate policy to maximise voters’ well-being, but bad politicians
get a private benefit of rt ∈ {0, R} from choosing xt 6= st.7 This benefit is on top of E,
which is enjoyed by all politicians and can be thought of as any psychological benefits
(“ego rents”) derived from being in office as well as a basic salary. The private benefit
rt is drawn each period from distribution G(r), whose mean is µ. The model assumes all
players discount the future with a common discount factor γ < 1 and that R > γ(µ+E).
The timing and informational structure are as follows. Nature determines the state
of the world at the beginning of each period, and draws the type of the politician (if
she is newly elected) from a distribution where Pr(i = g) = pi. Both are observable by
the politician but not by the voter. Nature then draws r1 from G(r), after which the
politician chooses her policy action x1(s1i), which is also unobservable by the voter. At
the end of the period, voters observe their well-being (their payoff) and either vote to
reelect the incumbent, or take a random draw from the pool of politicians. In the second
period, nature again draws r from G(r), the politician chooses her policy, and payoffs
accrue to the players.
Solving the game backwards, Besley (2006) shows that a perfect Bayesian equilibrium
(PBE) can be defined in which voters look to their well-being in order to update their
beliefs about the incumbent politician. In period 2 there are no re-election incentives,
in this paper, namely that, all else equal, incumbent reelection chances are increasing in voter welfare.
6See Campbell et al. (1960) for a classic study of voters’ (lack of) knowledge about politics and
economics (see Lewis-Beck et al., 2008, for an update).
7Choosing to set xt 6= st can be interpreted in a number of ways, ranging from a politician exerting
low effort, to giving in to special interests or pursuing a narrow ideological agenda, all the way to outright
corruption.
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so each politician will take her preferred action: good politicians will seek to maximise
voter well-being, whereas bad politicians will set xt 6= st. Voters thus have an interest in
selecting good politicians for the second period.
The key prediction to be tested in this paper is that at the end of period 1, voters will
re-elect the incumbent if they receive the high level of well-being H. Good politicians
always provide H, whereas a politician who fails to deliver it is a bad type for sure.
The probability that a bad politician will deliver the high level of well-being is Pr(r1 ≤
γ(µ + E)). If voters observe H and use Bayes’ rule, they will update their beliefs about
the incumbent and vote to reelect her, since the probability of a politician being good is
greater than the proportion pi of good politicians in the pool of candidates. That is,
Pr(i = g|H) = Pr(H|i = g)Pr(i = g)
Pr(H)
=
Pr(H|i = g)Pr(i = g)
Pr(i = g) + Pr(i = b)Pr(rt ≤ γ(µ+ E))
=
pi
pi + (1− pi)Pr(r1 ≤ γ(µ+ E)) ≥ pi.
This has implications for the incentives given to politicians. Bad types face a trade-off
in period 1 between extracting rents and being voted out of office, or behaving as a good
type and enjoying the benefits of a second term. Provided r1 is sufficiently small, they
will set xt = st to maximise voters’ well-being and secure reelection. The sections that
follow take this retrospective voting prediction to the data, where high levels of SWB are
expected to relate positively to the vote share received by incumbents.
Studies of economic voting provide an empirical test for the retrospective voting hy-
pothesis using the state of the economy as a proxy for the electorate’s welfare. Self-
reported measures of ‘experienced utility’—often loosely labelled as “happiness”—differ
from the more standard economic concept of ‘decision utility’ derived from revealed pref-
erence, meaning that welfare is treated here in terms that go beyond consumption (Kah-
neman, Wakker and Sarin, 1997; Rabin, 1998).8 In this paper, SWB is employed as a
broader and more direct measure of voter welfare. That is, rather than treating the
voter’s payoff solely in economic terms, H is interpreted as referring to the voter’s overall
sense of well-being, which depends on both material as well as non-material factors.
8Although the concepts of experienced and decision utility remain distinct from each other, recent
evidence shows SWB is also a relatively good predictor of choices and actions (Benjamin et al., 2012),
suggesting that measures of SWB such as life satisfaction can potentially be used as an imperfect proxy
for the more standard notion of decision utility. Proxying the traditional concept of welfare with SWB is
imperfect, however, since the study find that in certain situations the connection between decision and
experienced utility is much less clear and is in some cases systematically reversed (see also Kahneman
and Thaler, 2006; Perez-Truglia, 2010).
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3 Data
Electoral Data. The main outcome variable is cabinet vote share, which is the total
percentage of votes won by all of the parties that are in government prior to each election.
Further models instead consider the vote share received by the main coalition party only.
The sample consists of 153 parliamentary elections. Each country’s first election in the
sample is used as a control, and four are dropped from the analysis,9 leaving 134 obser-
vations in the baseline regression models. Election results are drawn from the University
of Bremen’s Parliament and Government Composition (ParlGov) database. Electoral
turnout data is taken from the Voter Turnout Database compiled by the Institute for
Democracy and Electoral Assistance.
SWB data. Data cover a panel of 15 European countries between 1973 and 2012. Life
satisfaction data are drawn from the Eurobarometer, a survey carried out (typically) twice
a year by the European Commission. For each wave, a random sample of approximately
1,000 individuals from each European Union country is interviewed. The SWB question
asks respondents: “On the whole, are you i) very satisfied, ii) fairly satisfied, iii) not very
satisfied, or iv) not at all satisfied with the life you lead?”. Self-reported life satisfaction
is only one way to measure SWB, but these evaluative, cognitive judgements are the
most widely used metric in the economic literature as well as by policymakers. Other
measures of interest encompass positive and negative affect as well as meaningfulness (see
Kahneman and Riis, 2005, for a discussion of differences between experienced/hedonic
and evaluative measures of SWB).10
The four category evaluative SWB question has been included in the survey at least
once every year from 1973 to 2012 (apart from 1974). The Eurobarometer began with
the original 9 EU member states in 1973, and has expanded along with the EU. In this
paper I look at an unbalanced panel of the 15 longest-duration EU members during
the 1973-2012 period, for which the maximum time-series is 39 years and the mean is
33 years.11 The countries included are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
9These are: Italy in 1994 and 1996, where the incumbent governments were technocratic ones led by
Carlo Azeglio Ciampi and Lamberto Dini respectively; and the second Greek elections of 1989 and 2012,
where Ioannis Grivas and Panagiotis Pikrammenos led non-partisan caretaker governments after both
years’ first elections had produced unworkable hung parliaments. In each case, there is no incumbent
party vote share to predict.
10Further research may investigate any relationships between these alternative measures of self-reported
well-being and electoral behaviour. A somewhat separate question from that investigated in this paper
is whether election-day happiness or positive/negative affect is able to account for variation in voting
behaviour. Healy, Malhotra and Mo (2010) show, for example, a robust association between local college
football wins in the 10 days prior to an election and the vote share of incumbents, a finding they attribute
to the positive emotional state of voters.
11A number of further states joined the EU (and thus also the Eurobarometer) in 2004, but are not
included here as there is only a relatively small number of SWB surveys, and even fewer matching
electoral data points, available for these countries.
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and the United Kingdom. Each election result is matched with the Eurobarometer survey
wave that is closest in time prior to that election. A Eurobarometer wave is available on
average around four months before each election (mean=4.12, standard deviation=3.38).
For a summary of the variety of ways in which the validity and reliability of this
kind of self-reported well-being measure have been demonstrated, see Krueger and Stone
(2014). As is standard in the literature, the responses are coded onto a 1-4 scale (with 4
corresponding to the “very satisfied” response). In the initial baseline models, I calculate
the mean of a country’s life satisfaction responses (on the 1-4 scale) at each survey,
employing the country-survey-mean SWB at the closest survey prior to each election as
a predictor of the result of that election. In further models, I first adjust life satisfaction
responses for individual demographic and partisan characteristics, and then employ the
country-survey mean of these adjusted SWB responses to predict voting patterns. In all
models, national levels of subjective well-being are standardised such that they have a
mean of zero and standard deviation of one.
Macroeconomic Data. Economic variables are taken from the OECD. GDP is mea-
sured per capita in purchasing power parity dollars at 2005 prices, the unemployment rate
is the percentage of the working population out of work, and inflation is the percentage
change in consumer prices. Economic growth is the percentage change in per capita GDP
from year t− 1 to year t. Each election is matched with the country-year value of these
macroeconomic indicators. Further analysis uses a one year lag (see below). Like national
subjective well-being, all macroeconomic input variables are standardised.
Further Controls. An important finding of the research on economic voting is that
cross-national evidence is often unstable due to variation in institutional design across
countries and the extent to which it is clear who is responsible for outcomes (Powell
and Whitten, 1993). This ‘clarity of responsibility’ thesis suggests, for example, that
where parties govern in coalitions—in which responsibility is diffuse—voters find it more
difficult to hold incumbents accountable for performance. Following this literature, I hold
constant a number of standard contextual variables. These further controls include the
number of parties in government and the length of time in months since the last election
(i.e. the length of the parliament), as well as a measure of the fragmentation of the party
system, which is the Effective Number of Parties (ENP) calculated following Laakso and
Taagepera (1979) as ENP = 1∑
(si)2
where s is percentage of parliamentary seats held by
party i prior to the election.
Summary statistics of the main variables are shown in Table 1, and broken down by
country in Table A4. As can be seen, there are persistent differences across countries
in SWB as well as the vote shares typically won by governing parties. Country fixed
effects are included in all of the analysis in order to exploit within-country variation and
partial out any such differences in well-being and voting behaviour that occur as a result




To test the prediction that high levels of well-being are positively associated with the
electoral success of incumbent governments, I estimate the baseline equation
Vit = β1SWBit + Vit−1 +X ′it + ξi + γt + εit (1)
where Vit is the percentage vote share received by all of the parties in government in
country i at election t, and SWBit is the aggregate level of SWB in country i prior to
election t. Vit−1 is the vote share that these parties collectively received at the previous
election and X ′it is a vector of situational controls including the length of the parliament,
the number of parties in government, and the fragmentation of the party system. Country
fixed effects ξi are included in all models, as are a set of year dummies γt. Finally, εit is
an error term adjusted for clustering at the country level.
4.2 Further Checks
Timing. A number of further checks are carried out in order to ensure any association
observed in the baseline equation is robust. I first perform falsification or “placebo”
tests in which I include the level of SWB taken from surveys following each election as a
predictor of the result of that election in order to ensure any association observed is not
spurious.
There is a potential danger that the election-year macroeconomic indicators used as
regressors may be influenced by developments in the economy that occur in the months
following the election, particularly if that election takes place in the early months of
the year. As a result, Table A1 replicates the main results using a one year lag of the
macroeconomic variables, which does very little to alter the main findings.
Macroeconomic Covariates. The use of country and year fixed effects as well as a
vector of contextual controls helps to reduce the problem of omitted variable bias. Nev-
ertheless, the most obvious omitted variable, given the extensive literature on economic
voting, is time-variant and thus not picked up by the fixed effect: the state of the econ-
omy, which may affect both the SWB of the population (e.g. Di Tella, MacCulloch and
Oswald, 2003) as well as having a direct impact on voting behaviour (e.g. Fair, 1978;
Kramer, 1971). That is, SWB may simply serve as a proxy for the state of the economy,
which is already known to matter for electoral outcomes. To attempt to deal with this and
investigate whether SWB has additional explanatory power, or whether the well-known
state-of-the-economy effect works through the economy’s impact on voters’ well-being,
I introduce the election-year economic growth rate as a regressor to proxy for the state
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of the economy. Of course, the headline growth rate is only partially informative about
the state of the economy, so the unemployment as well as the inflation rates are also
gradually introduced.
Specification. To ensure the results are not biased by the inclusion of the control for
incumbents’ previous vote share, I re-estimate equation 1 omitting this lagged electoral
score. Given the relatively small sample size, I also report models that bootstrap the
standard errors (with 250 replications). Finally, I run the baseline regression using the
vote share received by the Prime Minister’s (or equivalent) party only as the dependent
variable, rather than the collective vote share of the whole coalition.
Turnout. One important concern is that the result might be biased by variation in
turnout driven by the level of the electorate’s well-being.12 As a result, I establish whether
or not turnout can be predicted by SWB by running a regression similar to equation 1,
but replacing cabinet vote share with percentage turnout on the left-hand side.
4.3 Levels, changes and asymmetries
I next explore whether voters are more responsive to the country’s level of, or any recent
changes in, well-being, as well as whether there are any non-linearities in the relationship.
First, rather than using a country’s level of SWB as a predictor of government vote share,
I employ the change in a country’s mean SWB such that
Vit = β1∆SWBit + Vit−1 +X ′it + ξi + γt + εit (2)
where ∆SWBit is either the change in the standardised aggregate life satisfaction variable
over the length of the whole parliament (i.e. since the previous election) or the shorter-
term change from year t− 1 to year t (i.e. the calendar year prior to the election-year to
the election-year).
Finally, I use piecewise (or ‘segmented’) regression models to investigate any asymme-
tries in the relationship. In other words, I attempt to ascertain whether voters are more
moved to punish or reward incumbents for up- or downturns in the country’s well-being.
Where ∆SWBit is the main predictor of vote share, I create a spline that separates





it + Vit−1 +X
′
it + ξi + γt + εit (3)
where ∆SWB+ is equal to the change in SWB when it is positive (and 0 otherwise),
and ∆SWB− is equal to the change when it is negative (and 0 otherwise). To make the
coefficients more intuitive, the absolute value of negative changes is used, such a negative
12For evidence suggesting a link between political participation and SWB, see Dolan, Metcalfe and
Powdthavee (2008); Flavin and Keane (2012); Stutzer and Frey (2006).
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coefficient suggests that an “increase” in negative ∆ SWB is negatively associated with
cabinet vote share.
4.4 Further Robustness: Alternative SWB Aggregation Method
Adjustment for Demographic Determinants of SWB. This section outlines an
alternative strategy for aggregating well-being responses to a national measure of SWB,
which is carried out as a further robustness check of the main results. Whereas the
baseline regression uses the simple country-survey mean of life satisfaction responses
as the measure of SWBit, I also estimate a two-stage procedure similar to Di Tella,
MacCulloch and Oswald (1999) that includes individual predictors of SWB. The first




ijt + γt + εijt (4)
where SWBijt is the life satisfaction of individual i in country j at the survey t, X
′ is
a vector of demographic characteristics including age, gender, marital status and edu-
cation, and γt are survey-specific fixed effects. This obtains a measure of SWB that is
unexplained by the individual characteristics of respondents. A further benefit of this ap-
proach is that it allows for the introduction of survey-specific intercepts, which partial out
differences in the survey over time that may lead to question-ordering or context effects
that recent studies suggest can have an impact on life satisfaction responses (Deaton,
2012; Sacks, Stevenson and Wolfers, 2013). The country-survey mean of the residuals
from this regression might be thought of as what Di Tella, MacCulloch and Oswald
(1999) label a country’s level of “pure” SWB, on which government policy ought to be
focused. Aggregate residual life satisfaction is then used as an alternative measure of a
SWBit in equation 1. Table A2 shows the first-stage micro-level regressions.
Adjustment for Party-Political Determinants of SWB. Another important
concern is that coefficents may be biased if the life satisfaction of partisan individuals
varies simply as a result of the ideological colour of the party in office. Di Tella and
MacCulloch (2005) show, for example, that partisan individuals have higher life satisfac-
tion when their chosen party is in office. If this is the case, electoral preference for the
incumbent party drives life satisfaction rather than the other way around as the model
predicts.13 To deal with this potential problem of reverse causality, I also control for
13A related concern is often raised in the economic voting literature. In studies that rely on surveys of
voters’ economic perceptions, subjective perceptions of macroeconomic performance may be biased by
individuals’ partisan political leanings (Evans and Andersen, 2006). This shouldn’t be a major problem
here for two reasons. First, this analysis uses aggregate SWB: assuming a two-party system with a
roughly equal number of partisans on each side, whenever one party is in power their partisans will
have slightly higher well-being and the other slightly lower, cancelling each other out in the aggregate.
Second, conditioning on the previous vote share of the parties in power functions as a control for the
partisanship of the country.
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individuals’ ideological proximity to the sitting government, such that
SWBijt = β1X
′
ijt + β2Zijt + γt + εijt (5)
where Zijt is the distance between the individual i’s own ideology and that of the incum-
bent government of country j at time t.
This procedure relies on a reduced sample, since in some but not all Eurobarometer
rounds respondents are asked to place themselves on a 1-10 ideological scale (on which
1 is the most left-wing). The response to this question is matched with the ideological
position of the government in power at the time of the survey. This is computed by taking
the mean of the four main left-right scales used in the political science literature (Benoit
and Laver, 2006; Castles and Mair, 1984; Hooghe et al., 2010; Huber and Inglehart,
1995) of all of the parties in government, weighted by their respective vote shares. Both
ideology scales—individual and government—are normalised to lie between 0 and 1, and
the difference between the individual’s and the government’s position is then used as
a the ideological distance variable. Ideological distance enters significantly into the life
satisfaction equation, and is negatively signed as expected: column 2 of Table A2 shows
that individuals who are ideologically farther away from their national government do
indeed have systematically lower life satisfaction than people who are in closer ideological
agreement with those in power.14 The aggregate of the residuals from this regression is
then used as an alternative measure of SWBit in equation 1.
5 Results
The main findings are that i) the vote share received by governing parties is sensitive
to the aggregate SWB of the electorate, ii) this association is robust to the inclusion of
the main macroeconomic indicators as well as individual-level demographic and partisan
determinants of SWB, and iii) the electorate’s aggregate SWB is able to explain more
of the variance in the vote share enjoyed by governing parties than any one of the three
main macroeconomic indicators. This section outlines these findings in more detail, along
with results from a number of alternative specifications and robustness checks.
14An alternative strategy to show this, reported in column 3 of Table A2, leads to similar results.
Following Di Tella and MacCulloch (2005), I estimate a regression including dummies for left-wing and
right-wing partisans (those responding 1-3 and 8-10 on the left-right scale respectively), and interact these
with the “right-wingness” of the government, measured by the ideological scale of the government (on
which higher values indicate that government is more right-wing). The results show that right-wingers
are happier, and left-wing partisans less so, the more right wing is the government.
12
Main Results
As expected from the simple model, column 1 of Table 2 shows a relationship that is
both statistically and substantively significant between life satisfaction and cabinet vote
share. Since all variables are z-scored, model (1) suggests that a one standard deviation
change in SWB over time is associated with around an 8.5 percentage point (86% of a
standard deviation) swing in the vote share enjoyed by the governing coalition.
Columns (2) to (4) of Table 2 replicate the well-established finding that the electoral
fate of incumbents is associated with the state of the macroeconomy. All three indicators
are significantly linked with cabinet vote share. A one standard deviation change in the
election-year economic growth rate is associated with a 4.5 percentage point change in
government vote share, whilst a one standard deviation change in the unemployment rate
over time is predictive of a swing of around 3.5 percentage points.
The remaining models in Table 2 consider the robustness of the result presented in
column 1 to the gradual inclusion of macroeconomic controls. When included together in
column (5), both economic growth and SWB remain positively and significantly related
to cabinet vote share. The negative association between unemployment and government
electoral success loses significance, however, once SWB is included as a covariate, suggest-
ing that voter well-being may be a mediator through which the effect of the unemploy-
ment rate feeds through to voting behaviour. Once all three macroeconomic indicators
are included along with SWB in column (9), both SWB and the economic growth rate
independently emerge as good predictors of the electoral fate of incumbent governments.
A one standard deviation change in SWB and the economic growth rate are associated
with percentage point swings of 6.6 and 3.5 respectively.
The relative r-squared values reported across the models shed light on which alterna-
tive measures of national welfare are most predictive of electoral outcomes. They suggest
that the inflation and unemployment rates fare comparatively worse than SWB and eco-
nomic growth, which are both good predictors of cabinet vote share. However, a country’s
level of self-reported life satisfaction is able to predict more of the variance in the electoral
success of governing parties than any one of the three main macroeconomic indicators.
The models most able to explain variance in government vote share are those that employ
both economic variables, and the election-year growth rate in particular, together with
the broader measure of SWB.
Further checks
In order to investigate whether the correlation between vote share and SWB found in
Table 2 is spurious, model (2) of Table 3 runs a falsification or “placebo” test. Here, the
level of SWB of a country in the year following each election is used as a predictor of that
election. The well-being of the electorate in this case is not significantly related with the
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election result. A similar test (not reported) using surveys two years after each election
produces the same null result. Column (1) shows, however, that the aggregate level of
SWB in the country-year prior to the election (rather than the closest prior survey to the
election as in the baseline) is significantly predictive of the result.
Column (3) reports a model that bootstraps the standard errors (with 250 replica-
tions), which does little to alter the main result. Column (4) omits the strong control
for the vote share of the cabinet parties at the previous election, which similarly does
not significantly affect the main finding. Column (5) shows the main result is not being
driven by electoral turnout, which is unrelated to the level of SWB.15 Model (6) uses the
prime minister’s (or equivalent) party vote share only—rather than the collective govern-
ing coalition vote share—as the outcome, which does not alter the main findings of the
paper: A one standard deviation change in a country’s SWB over time is associated with
around a 6 percentage point swing in the vote share enjoyed by the main coalition party
in power.
Table 4 reports results from the two-stage procedure outlined above, rather than
simply looking at the mean aggregate life satisfaction responses in each country-survey.
Table A2 in the appendix shows the first-stage micro-level regressions. The second-stage
models shown in Table 4 show the relationship between the aggregate of the residuals from
the micro-level equation 4 and cabinet vote share. Columns (1) and (2) begin by looking
at the case in which only the survey-specific intercepts and no demographic controls are
included in the first stage (that is, X ′ is left empty). The positive relationship between life
satisfaction and incumbent electoral success remains robust, a result that is not altered
when various demographic well-being determinants such as age, gender and education
are adjusted for in columns (3) and (4). After controlling for well-being differences based
on individuals’ ideological proximity to the sitting government in models (5) and (6), the
main finding of the paper remains unchanged.
Finally, Table A1 replicates the results using a one year lag of the macroeconomic
variables. In the baseline equation, the election-year macroeconomic indicators are used.
However, employing the previous year’s macroeconomic indicators does very little to
alter the main findings. A one standard deviation change in SWB (measured a mean of
4 months [SD=3] prior to the election) and the economic growth rate in the year prior
to the vote are associated with swings of 6.7 and 2.5 percentage points respectively.
15One concern with this model is that it may overlook variation in whether voters are legally obliged
to vote. Differences in compulsory voting will largely be accounted for with the country fixed effect;
however, controlling for any within-country changes in electoral laws, a model (not reported) that includes
a dummy for compulsory voting does not change the result.
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Levels and changes
Table 5 reports models that aim to test whether it is the level of, or recent changes
in, SWB that are most predictive of electoral outcomes. Here, the level variables are
standardised as in the previous tables, such that they have a mean of zero and a standard
deviation of one. The ∆ variables refer to election-year changes (i.e. changes from the
year prior to the election to the year of the vote) in this standardised variable. The
findings suggest there are both level and change effects at play in terms of SWB, but
that the change effect dominates in terms of GDP. Table A3, reported in the appendix,
repeats this analysis using changes that occur over whole parliament (i.e. since the last
election) rather than the more recent change from the year prior to the election to the
election year.16
Asymmetries
Models (4) to (6) in Table 5 report piecewise regression models that investigate whether
voters are more moved to punish or reward incumbents for any recent positive or negative
changes in either their SWB and/or the country’s GDP. Column (5) replicates the finding
in the economic voting literature (e.g. Bloom and Price, 1975) that voters are more
sensitive to changes in national income when those changes are negative, with voters
punishing governing parties for recessions more than they reward them for equivalent
periods of economic expansion.
Introducing separate variables for positive and negative election-year changes in SWB
in column (4) leads to a similar finding. Conditional on the level, an election-year change
SWB is significantly associated with an electoral loss to governing parties when that
change is negative, but any election year increases in SWB are not significantly associated
with electoral outcomes.
6 Discussion
The results provide evidence that the vote share received by governing parties is sensitive
to the electorate’s SWB. This is consistent with rational voting models in which voters
learn about an incumbent’s quality through observable outcomes such as their own welfare
(e.g. Alt, Bueno de Mesquita and Rose, 2011; Ashworth, 2005; Banks and Sundaram,
1998; Besley, 2006). One major advantage of the use of SWB data is that it allows for
a direct test of the predicted association between voter welfare and incumbent retention.
Further, since observing one’s own satisfaction with life is essentially costless and does not
16Introducing both short- and longer-term changes in SWB together into the equation (not reported),
the short-run change dominates, with the whole-parliament change becoming statistically insignificant.
These findings echo those in the economic voting literature, suggesting that election-year changes are
more important to voters than any changes over the whole election cycle (Tufte, 1978).
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require voters to have a thoroughgoing understanding of complex economic and political
issues, the use of such measures also sits well with the informational asymmetry at the
heart of many political agency models.
The central findings of the paper contribute to an on-going debate on how best to
evaluate policy outcomes and measure national progress. The evidence presented here
suggests that government initiatives to measure success in terms of SWB align with citizen
expectations: voters do themselves seem to evaluate government performance at least
partly in terms of their SWB. This has important implications for the incentives faced
by politicians to undertake costly actions to improve the electorate’s SWB. The simple
model studied in this paper suggests that this type of retrospective voting behaviour gives
governments electoral incentives to continue to measure the SWB of their citizens and
use the data to guide policymaking focused on the electorate’s comprehensive well-being.
Although the findings are consistent with a simple explanatory political agency model,
econometrically this paper has focused—much like the existing literature on economic
voting—on the prediction rather than causal explanation of electoral outcomes. The
analysis demonstrates that SWB is strongly predictive of election results, and that this
finding is robust to the inclusion of country and year fixed effects, the main macroe-
conomic indicators, and various demographic and partisan determinants of individuals’
life satisfaction, as well as a number of alternative specifications. Nevertheless, further
research may look to exploit any natural experiments in order to more clearly identify
the effect and more closely investigate the mechanisms through which well-being feeds
into voting behaviour, for example by attempting to isolate and compare the sanction
and selection effects expounded in the model, or examining the extent to which voters
distinguish between policy-relevant and policy-irrelevant sources of their well-being when
it comes to evaluating government performance.17
Electoral outcomes are best predicted in the sample by a combination of both SWB
together with economic growth. The simple model posits that voters observe their well-
being—their payoff H—in order to update their beliefs about the incumbent. In this way,
it assumes that SWB is a mediator through which economic performance feeds through
into voting behaviour: insofar as a buoyant economy improves people’s life satisfaction,
it provides voters with information about the politician’s type. Consistent with this as-
sumption, the unemployment rate becomes non-predictive of electoral outcomes once it
17That is, an interesting question beyond the scope of this paper is whether governments are rewarded
for high levels of societal well-being that are brought about through sound policy, or are they lucky recip-
ients of a reward that is not based on their actions, much like CEOs that are rewarded for economy-wide
rises in stock prices (cf. Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001). A handful of recent empirical papers suggest
that voters do indeed often fail to filter, holding incumbents accountable for outcomes that are beyond
their control such as shark attacks, floods, and droughts (Achen and Bartels, 2003), macroeconomic
fluctuations driven by international oil prices (Wolfers, 2007), and even college football results (Healy,
Malhotra and Mo, 2010). Determining what is and is not relevant to voters’ well-being is very difficult,
however, since government is expected to play a role—at least as a safety net—in so many areas of life.
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is included in an equation together with SWB, suggesting that voters may reward gov-
ernments for lower rates of unemployment precisely because of the negative (direct and
indirect) effects that high unemployment rates have on people’s well-being (Clark and
Oswald, 1994; Di Tella, MacCulloch and Oswald, 2003; Luechinger, Meier and Stutzer,
2010). However, the finding that economic growth has a relationship that is to some
extent independent of aggregate SWB suggests this assumption may be too strong. The
finding that both are separately important accords with recent work suggesting “happi-
ness is not everything”—that is, that well-being is multifaceted and seems to be dependent
upon a number of factors including both life satisfaction as well as material prosperity
(Benjamin et al., 2014; Glaeser, Gottlieb and Ziv, 2015).18
Although the evidence is consistent with rational accounts of electoral behaviour,
retrospective voting may also be subject to emotional and cognitive biases (Healy and
Malhotra, 2013). First, voters seem to blame the government for their low levels of life
satisfaction but fail to reward them for higher levels. This asymmetry in the relationship
between negative and positive changes in SWB and electoral outcomes is consistent with
idea that individuals are prone to a ‘self-serving bias’ (Miller and Ross, 1975), whereby
they attribute success to their own efforts but attribute failure to situational factors and
the actions of others. Second, the finding that voters are informed more acutely by recent
events, rather than a full evaluation of a politician’s time in office, accords with the idea
of individuals using an ‘availability heuristic’ by basing their decision on easily recallable
pieces of information such as their current or recent sense of well-being (Tversky and
Kahneman, 1973). Further empirical work can exploit SWB data to investigate these as
well as other cognitive and emotional biases in voting behaviour further. At the same
time, careful theoretical work is required in order to incorporate systematic voter biases
into political economy models. This is important not only for our understanding of how
these biases influence voting behaviour, but also to determine their consequences in terms
of the incentives that are given to politicians to act in the interests of voters.
7 Conclusion
The literature on retrospective voting—the notion that citizens vote according to how well
the country has fared during an incumbent’s time in office—is extensive, but concentrates
almost exclusively on the performance of the domestic economy. Given that governments
act in a variety of policy domains, there seems little a priori reason for voters to evaluate
incumbent performance solely on economic outcomes. For example, recent evidence on
the impact of the Moving to Opportunities experiment in the United States—which gave
the opportunity, via random lottery, to families living in high-poverty public housing
18For a further discussion, see Becker and Rayo (2008).
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projects to move to less-disadvantaged neighbourhoods—shows that the programme led
to improvements in SWB but had no significant effect on employment or earnings (Ludwig
et al., 2013). Whereas one might expect the well-being increases associated with such
a programme to have at least some bearing on participants’ beliefs about incumbent
politicians, a narrow focus on economic variables would expect such policy outcomes to
be unrelated to voting behaviour. Although policymakers have only recently begun to
think of success and progress in terms of national happiness, the data presented here from
a cross-country panel stretching back to the 1970s suggest that voters themselves seem
to have long evaluated government performance in terms that go beyond GDP.
Employing SWB as a broad and direct proxy for social welfare, the analysis provides a
novel test of political economy models that predict a positive association between voters’
welfare and their propensity to reelect incumbent governments. Importantly, such models
emphasise the incentives that this political accountability provides for incumbents to
undertake costly actions to improve the quality of people’s lives. The data suggest it
is in politicians’ interest not only to make voters financially better off, but also to take




Table 1: Summary statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev.
Cabinet Vote Share (%) 134 43.28 9.51
Previous Vote Share (%) 134 46.71 10.35
Subjective Well-being 134 3.09 0.31
Economic Growth (%) 134 1.87 2.65
Unemployment Rate (%) 134 8.06 4.32
Inflation Rate (%) 134 4.95 4.90
GDP per capita ($2005) 134 26,144 8,771
No. of Parties in Gov’ 134 2.16 1.14
Effective No. of Parties 134 4.51 1.66
Parliament Length (months) 134 42.92 13.24
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Table 2: Subjective Wellbeing and Electoral Outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Cabinet Vote Share
Subjective Well-being 0.86∗∗∗ 0.72∗∗∗ 0.74∗∗∗ 0.82∗∗∗ 0.64∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.12) (0.14) (0.11) (0.18)
Economic Growth 0.45∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.09) (0.10)
Unemployment Rate -0.34∗∗ -0.16 -0.06
(0.12) (0.13) (0.15)
Inlfation Rate 0.27∗∗ 0.19 0.15
(0.12) (0.11) (0.13)
Observations 134 134 134 134 134 134 134 134
R2 0.62 0.61 0.57 0.55 0.67 0.63 0.63 0.68
Robust standard errors in parentheses, adjusted for clustering at the country level. All variables standardised
(mean=0, SD=1). All regressions also include: country fixed effects, year dummies, previous vote share, no.
of parties in gov’, ENP, length of parliament.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 3: Robustness to Alternative Specifications
SWB−1year SWB+1year Bootstraped No previous Alternative
SEs vote share DVs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cabinet Vote Share Turnout PM Vote Share
Subjective Well-being 0.66∗∗∗ 0.34 0.86∗∗∗ 0.74∗∗∗ 0.06 0.64∗∗∗
(0.17) (0.17) (0.14) (0.16) (0.16) (0.20)
Observations 126 128 134 134 134 131
R2 0.55 0.56 0.62 0.54 0.67 0.57
Robust standard errors in parentheses, adjusted for clustering at the country level. Bootstrap SEs reported in model (3)
are based on 250 replications. All variables standardised (mean=0, SD=1). Unless otherwise stated, all regressions also
include: country fixed effects, year dummies, previous vote share, no. of parties in gov’, ENP, length of parliament.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 4: Robustness: Adjusting for Individual-level Determinants of SWB
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cabinet Vote Share
Adjusted SWB 0.84∗∗∗ 0.65∗∗∗ 0.76∗∗∗ 0.60∗∗∗ 0.54∗∗ 0.55∗∗
(0.10) (0.19) (0.12) (0.18) (0.23) (0.23)
Economic Growth 0.38∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗ 0.35∗∗∗
(0.09) (0.10) (0.09)
Unemployment Rate -0.06 -0.06 -0.06
(0.16) (0.15) (0.17)
Inflation Rate 0.15 0.15 0.14
(0.13) (0.13) (0.14)
Country FEs X X X X X X
Year FEs X X X X X X
Observations 134 134 134 134 127 127
R2 0.61 0.68 0.61 0.68 0.63 0.68
SWB Adjusted For:
Survey FEs X X X X X X
Demographic Controls X X X X
Partisanship Controls X X
Robust standard errors in parentheses, adjusted for clustering at the country level. All
variables standardised (mean=0, SD=1). All regressions also include: country fixed
effects, year dummies, previous vote share, no. of parties in gov’, ENP, length of parlia-
ment. Adjusted SWB is obtained from an initial micro-level life satisfaction regression,
which includes survey fixed effects and differing combinations (depending on the model)
of individual determinants of SWB responses (see main text for details).
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 5: Levels and Election-year Changes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cabinet Vote Share
Levels
Subjective Well-being 0.65∗∗∗ 0.56∗∗∗ 0.60∗∗∗ 0.52∗∗∗
(0.12) (0.13) (0.10) (0.11)
GDP per capita -0.00 -0.01 -0.04 -0.04
(0.11) (0.09) (0.12) (0.09)
Changes
∆ SWB 0.89∗∗ 0.72∗∗
(0.34) (0.28)
∆ GDP 0.90∗∗ 0.67∗∗
(0.33) (0.25)
Piecewise Changes
Spline: ∆ SWB < 0 -2.08∗∗∗ -1.73∗∗∗
(0.38) (0.28)
Spline: ∆ SWB > 0 -0.49 -0.48
(0.50) (0.47)
Spline: ∆ GDP < 0 -1.52∗∗ -1.08∗
(0.69) (0.59)
Spline: ∆ GDP > 0 0.58∗ 0.34
(0.28) (0.29)
Observations 126 126 126 126 126 126
R2 0.61 0.57 0.64 0.64 0.58 0.67
Robust standard errors in parentheses, adjusted for clustering at the country level. All
regressions include: country fixed effects, year dummies, previous vote share, no. of
parties in gov’, ENP, length of parliament. GDP is measured per capita; it is logged and
then de-trended. The outcome and level variables are standardised (mean=0, SD=1). ∆
variables refer to changes in the standardised level variable from the year prior to the
election to the year of the election. Splines are the absolute value of the change variable
when it is negative (positive), and zero otherwise.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Appendix
Table A1: Macroeconomic variables lagged 1 year
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Cabinet Vote Share
Subjective Well-being 0.87∗∗∗ 0.71∗∗∗ 0.81∗∗∗ 0.82∗∗∗ 0.62∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.11) (0.13) (0.11) (0.18)
GDP per Capita (-1 Year) -0.04 -0.11
(0.11) (0.12)
Economic Growth (-1 Year) 0.21∗∗ 0.27∗∗
(0.09) (0.10)
Unemployment Rate (-1 Year) -0.09 -0.03
(0.12) (0.19)
Inflation Rate (-1 Year) 0.19 0.23
(0.12) (0.14)
Observations 134 134 134 134 134
R2 0.62 0.64 0.62 0.63 0.66
Robust standard errors in parentheses, adjusted for clustering at the country level. All
variables standardised (mean=0, SD=1). All regressions also include: country fixed
effects, year dummies, previous vote share, no. of parties in gov’, ENP, length of par-
liament. SWB is recorded at the closest prior survey to the election (mean 4 months
before); macroeconomic variables refer to the country-year prior to the election.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table A2: Individual-Level Predictors of SWB
(1) (2) (3)
Life Satisfaction
Age -0.024∗∗∗ -0.022∗∗∗ -0.022∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age2 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Medium Education Level (vs. low) 0.127∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
High Education Level (vs. low) 0.299∗∗∗ 0.272∗∗∗ 0.271∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.009) (0.009)
Married (vs. single) 0.114∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Live as Married 0.143∗∗∗ 0.153∗∗∗ 0.152∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
Divorced -0.114∗∗∗ -0.111∗∗∗ -0.113∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Widowed -0.117∗∗∗ -0.100∗∗∗ -0.102∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Separated -0.239∗∗∗ -0.217∗∗∗ -0.221∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011)
Male (vs. female) -0.026∗∗∗ -0.033∗∗∗ -0.032∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Individual Left-Right Placement 0.027∗∗∗
(0.001)
Ideological Distance from Government -0.080∗∗∗
(0.026)
Individual is Left-wing (vs. centrist) -0.048∗∗∗
(0.017)
Individual is right-wing -0.099∗∗∗
(0.019)
Right-wingness of Government 0.025∗∗∗
(0.007)
Left-Wing Indiv’ * Right-Wingness of Gov’ -0.015∗∗∗
(0.003)
Right-Wing Indiv’ * Right-Wingness of Gov’ 0.026∗∗∗
(0.003)
Survey Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1023943 762218 762218
R2 0.04 0.05 0.05
Robust standard errors adjusted for country-survey clustering in parentheses. Dependent
variable: Life Satisfaction (1-4 scale). Left- and right-wing indicators refer to individuals
responding 1-3 and 8-10 on the left-right placement scale respectively. Ideological proximity
to the government is the difference between an individual’s own ideological placement and
the ideological position of the sitting government (see text for more details).
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table A3: Levels and Whole Parliament Changes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cabinet Vote Share
Levels
Subjective Well-being 0.78∗∗∗ 0.74∗∗∗ 0.77∗∗ 0.73∗∗∗
(0.23) (0.20) (0.27) (0.23)
GDP per capita -0.07 -0.10 -0.07 -0.10
(0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
Changes
∆ SWB 0.02 -0.12
(0.21) (0.25)
∆ GDP 0.29∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.07)
Piecewise Changes
Spline: ∆ SWB < 0 0.05 -0.13
(0.56) (0.61)
Spline: ∆ SWB > 0 -0.02 -0.17
(0.35) (0.35)
Spline: ∆ GDP < 0 -0.42∗∗∗ -0.36∗∗
(0.13) (0.15)
Spline: ∆ GDP > 0 0.15 0.16
(0.10) (0.11)
Observations 119 119 119 119 119 119
R2 0.61 0.60 0.65 0.61 0.61 0.66
Robust standard errors in parentheses, adjusted for clustering at the country level. All
regressions include: country fixed effects, year dummies, previous vote share, no. of
parties in gov’, ENP, length of parliament. GDP is measured per capita; it is logged and
then de-trended. The outcome and level variables are standardised (mean=0, SD=1).
∆ variables refer to changes in the standardised level variable since the last election.
Splines are the absolute value of the change variable when it is negative (positive), and
zero otherwise.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table A4: Summary Statistics by Country
Country AUT BEL DEU DNK ESP FIN FRA GBR GRC IRL ITA LUX NLD PRT SWE Total
First Available SWB 1995 1973 1973 1973 1985 1995 1973 1973 1981 1973 1973 1973 1973 1985 1995
First Election in Sample 1994 1971 1972 1971 1982 1991 1968 1970 1977 1969 1972 1968 1972 1983 1994
Last Election in Sample 2008 2010 2009 2011 2011 2011 2012 2010 2012 2011 2008 2009 2012 2011 2010
Number of Elections 6 13 11 16 9 5 10 11 13 12 11 9 13 9 5 153
Cabinet Vote Share (%) 54.49 49.64 50.40 36.61 38.98 55.42 38.15 37.63 39.61 40.95 43.75 54.44 42.86 39.67 40.19 43.28
(10.46) (9.67) (5.50) (6.87) (6.25) (8.97) (9.71) (4.76) (3.93) (8.05) (5.54) (4.60) (11.81) (7.95) (6.38) (9.51)
Subjective Well-being 3.10 3.15 3.03 3.55 2.98 3.19 2.84 3.18 2.57 3.16 2.76 3.30 3.38 2.58 3.37 3.09
(0.10) (0.15) (0.06) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.10) (0.10) (0.23) (0.09) (0.15) (0.05) (0.07) (0.15) (0.08) (0.31)
Economic Growth (%) 2.24 1.80 1.37 1.54 1.72 3.16 1.31 1.71 0.36 3.06 2.35 3.28 1.00 1.89 3.92 1.87
(1.09) (1.21) (2.76) (1.90) (2.18) (1.40) (1.72) (2.09) (3.69) (4.05) (2.74) (4.42) (2.00) (3.21) (1.44) (2.65)
Unemployment Rate (%) 3.98 8.22 7.14 6.19 17.48 8.40 9.27 6.49 10.10 11.36 8.28 2.63 6.30 7.24 7.22 8.06
(0.42) (2.37) (2.50) (2.38) (4.85) (1.45) (2.33) (3.38) (5.13) (4.43) (1.51) (1.88) (2.86) (2.85) (1.49) (4.32)
Inflation Rate (%) 1.86 4.14 2.28 5.43 4.68 1.99 4.06 6.67 9.17 8.37 7.99 3.60 2.95 4.42 1.14 4.95
(0.98) (3.49) (1.70) (3.80) (2.05) (1.19) (4.25) (5.98) (8.32) (7.11) (6.15) (2.93) (2.23) (3.87) (0.95) (4.90)
GDP per capita (2005$) 32267 25072 26013 25761 23063 30093 24823 23519 20262 22617 23149 45656 29179 19277 31208 26144
(3430) (5543) (4811) (5562) (4343) (3349) (4108) (6600) (3739) (10398) (4976) (16814) (6308) (2973) (3523) (8771)
Num Parties in Gov’ 2.00 4.25 2.60 2.33 1.00 4.00 2.11 1.00 1.20 1.82 2.88 2.00 2.33 1.13 1.75 2.16
(0.00) (0.45) (0.52) (1.18) (0.00) (0.82) (0.33) (0.00) (0.63) (0.60) (1.25) (0.00) (0.49) (0.35) (1.50) (1.14)
ENP 3.60 8.16 3.55 5.31 3.32 5.82 5.21 3.16 2.88 3.32 4.98 4.23 5.16 3.33 4.34 4.51
(0.34) (1.56) (0.52) (0.66) (0.42) (0.12) (0.99) (0.32) (0.37) (0.58) (1.28) (0.48) (1.12) (0.66) (0.47) (1.66)
Parl’ Length (months) 33.40 38.58 44.20 32.00 43.63 48.25 52.33 47.90 40.40 41.45 47.88 60.75 39.83 38.50 48.00 42.92
(14.50) (9.90) (6.43) (11.65) (5.13) (0.50) (11.83) (15.21) (7.63) (18.57) (12.60) (1.75) (15.00) (13.75) (0.00) (13.24)
Mean (standard deviation). First election for each country used as a control. Last available SWB for all countries is 2012.
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